out and take actions that might have cost him his command. For example, contrary to official government policy, during Operation Torch (invasion of North Africa) Ike chose to work with a top admiral in the French navy, a collaborator with the Vichy government, as a necessary expedient to save allied and French lives. Third, during Operations Torch and Overlord (invasion of Europe), Ike was observed to exercise two styles of leadership. One was the role of a firm, confident, hard-driving general who was aggressive, outspoken and definite about what he wanted. The second was the "chairman of the board" style as Ike presided, rather than deciding, often getting his way by negotiation and compromise. With the latter style, Ike was sometimes observed to use a technique he learned from General MacArthur. Ike would initially criticize proposals he agreed with, and sound enthusiastic about ideas he didn't agree with. Ike believed that this approach reserved him his freedom of action while picking others' brains. Fourth, Ike's assignments included considerable variety. By his own account, he held a dozen different jobs since serving in the Philippines.
Early in Ike's career (1920s) he was told by one of his mentors, General Fox Connor (General Pershing's Chief of Staff in WWI), that the next war would be fought as part of a coalition of nations, thereby predisposing Ike to working in a strategic alliance. General Connor predicted that the allies would require "very well understood mechanisms and organisms to keep themselves together and not work at cross-purposes." Consequently, when Ike became allied commander in WWII, he stressed unity above national interests. He would immediately challenge any idea that appeared to him to only represent a nationalistic attitude or viewpoint. As a telling example, Ike relieved from duty a US Colonel who, in a dispute with a British officer, called him a British S.O.B. Ike told the Colonel that he was correct in the dispute, and that the British officer may have been an S.O.B., but that the Colonel committed a cardinal sin by calling him a British S.O.B. During Operation Torch (the invasion of North Africa), Ike came to realize that national interests and prejudice were more critical than the typical obstacles such as differences in equipment and staff procedures and methods of organization.
One of the important questions facing Ike was how to design the alliance structure. Over time, he decided on several important aspects. First, in contrast to the philosophy of "co-operation" that plagued leadership in WWI, Ike insisted on total operating command over all alliance forces. For example, based on his experiences with Operation Torch, Ike demanded control of air forces when he became allied commander of Operation Overlord, the invasion of Europe. Eventually he was given such control for a critical period of time--April 1944 to September 1944. Second, the structure included a Combined (US and British) Chiefs of Staff to which Ike reported, thereby buffering Ike somewhat from the (political) pressures of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. (This decision was made primarily by Churchill and Roosevelt.) Third, Ike created a single chain of command, taking apart the US and British chains of command, with alternating US and British links. Fourth, Ike integrated two staff systems: the British use of coordinating committees and conferences to get things done vs. the US use of simple, small staffs under direct control, trying to keep the best of both. In fact, it seems that Ike chose (or was persuaded by the British to choose) the British model, but somehow gained more success with this model than its record would have predicted. Fifth, Ike faced the perennial structural decisions regarding centralization and decentralization. For example, during the Normandy campaign, which consisted of a relatively narrow front, Ike chose a centralized design, deciding on one battle commander (Montgomery) to be in charge of coordination between two army groups. After the Normandy breakthrough, and the early establishment of British and US army groups in France, British interests wanted Montgomery to continue in the role of commander of all ground troops. Instead, Ike chose a decentralized design, designating three commanders, with all three reporting to Ike.
An interesting dilemma facing Ike and his alliance partners is that of determining the extent to which there should be some kind of contractual provisions to protect partners' interests versus the need to maintain flexibility in uncertain environments and the impossibility of anticipating all possible contingencies. It seems clear that the alliances had few, if any, contractual provisions. The only point of agreement consistently agreed upon was that, at some point, Europe would be invaded; however, even the location and timing of that event were debated at length. Perhaps the level of trust between the members played a role.
Ike emphasized two aspects of the alliance. First, he made every effort to ensure that potential alliance partner resources were made available and used. These resources included British, Canadian and Australian troops and equipment, and also Great Britain as a staging base. Second, and perhaps less predictable, Ike worked hard at developing good relationships with the alliance partners. For example, soon after arriving in London Ike began the practice, despite powerful competing demands on his time, of meeting twice weekly with Churchill, both at Churchill's office and having dinner with Churchill at his residence. Although Ike's initial relationship with General DeGaulle might fairly be described as rocky, by the end of 1943 both men grew to admire and trust the other. This evolution was due, at least in part, by Ike's willingness both to stand up to DeGaulle and also Ike's willingness to admit when he was wrong. Also a part of this "relationship lever" was his ability to work with personalities, such as Churchill, DeGaulle, General Montgomery and General Patton, that often were brilliant but difficult, together with Ike's approach to delegation.
There was no manual or precedent that Eisenhower could consult on how to mold two (USA and British) nationalities that generally distrusted each other into a single, unified force. Several factors may have helped. First was Ike's ability to engage in fierce debate with prima donna personalities, while retaining respect, or even liking in some cases, for the other party. This ability was especially noteworthy given Ike's well known temper. Second was his willingness to put up with annoying, or inappropriate behavior, such as Patton's, in order to retain an individual's services for future battles. However, Ike could be very firm when conditions warranted it. For example, during a meeting between Ike and General Montgomery, Monty got a bit out of hand. Eisenhower leaned forward and touched Montgomery's knee. "'Steady Monty. You can't speak to me like that. I'm your boss." Third was Ike's approach to delegation which was influenced by his experiences, both positive and negative, with officers he served under. Ike insisted that subordinates act on their own conclusions in their own sphere of responsibility, and consequently tried not to micro manage. Also Ike believed in backing subordinates to the fullest and was quick to give credit to subordinates rather than claim the lion's share of the credit for favorable developments. Another characteristic of Ike's was his insistence, influenced by his association with General Marshall, that all staff and operations officers maintain a positive attitude, even in the face of dire challenges. Finally, Ike, perhaps counterintuitively given his insistence on being in command of all forces, believed that success, especially in allied commands is measured more by an ability to lead and persuade versus fixed notions of arbitrary command.
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